Future quantum networks will enable longdistance quantum key distribution (QKD) by providing on-demand entanglement to arbitrary combinations of users [1] [2] [3] [4] . Paradigmatic QKD protocols establish secure keys between pairs of users, however when more than two parties want to communicate, recently introduced quantum conference quantum key agreement (CKA) protocols can drastically outperform 2-party primitives in terms of resource cost [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . Here we implement a four-user quantum CKA protocol using polarisation-encoded Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) entangled states generated by high-brightness, telecom photon-pair sources. We distribute these states over fibre connections of up to 50km length and implement custom multiparty error correction and privacy amplification on the resulting raw keys. From a finite-key analysis, we establish an information-theoretic secure key of up to 1.15 × 10 6 bits, which is used to encrypt and securely share an image between the four users. Surpassing the previous maximum distance for GHZ state transmission [12] by more than an order of magnitude, these results demonstrate the viability of network protocols relying on multi-partite entanglement. Future applications beyond quantum CKA include entanglement-assisted remote clock-synchronization [13, 14] , quantum secret sharing [15] , and GHZ-based repeater protocols [16] .
Future quantum networks will enable longdistance quantum key distribution (QKD) by providing on-demand entanglement to arbitrary combinations of users [1] [2] [3] [4] . Paradigmatic QKD protocols establish secure keys between pairs of users, however when more than two parties want to communicate, recently introduced quantum conference quantum key agreement (CKA) protocols can drastically outperform 2-party primitives in terms of resource cost [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . Here we implement a four-user quantum CKA protocol using polarisation-encoded Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) entangled states generated by high-brightness, telecom photon-pair sources. We distribute these states over fibre connections of up to 50km length and implement custom multiparty error correction and privacy amplification on the resulting raw keys. From a finite-key analysis, we establish an information-theoretic secure key of up to 1.15 × 10 6 bits, which is used to encrypt and securely share an image between the four users. Surpassing the previous maximum distance for GHZ state transmission [12] by more than an order of magnitude, these results demonstrate the viability of network protocols relying on multi-partite entanglement. Future applications beyond quantum CKA include entanglement-assisted remote clock-synchronization [13, 14] , quantum secret sharing [15] , and GHZ-based repeater protocols [16] .
Conference key agreement is a multi-user protocol for sharing a common information-theoretic secure key beyond the two-party paradigm [5] . This key allows groupwide encryption for authenticated users to communicate securely, wherein exclusively members of the group can decrypt messages broadcast by any other member. The canonical approach to distribute a conference key is to iterate two-party QKD (2QKD) primitives to establish secret keys between pairs of users in the group, followed by an additional bitwise XOR operation per pair of users transforming the unique keys into a common secret † These two authors contributed equally. key [17, 18] . An alternative approach is to share genuine multi-partite GHZ-entangled states [7, 8] between users of the group, enabling the direct extraction of the conference key without requiring this additional step. Remarkably, quantum CKA can outperform 2QKD when N users are arranged within some general network with constrained channel capacity and quantum routers [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . Furthermore, quantum network coding schemes [4] allow the distillation of a shared N-user GHZ state from a single network use, reducing the resource cost-and thus increasing the key rate-achievable in quantum CKA by a factor (N-1) [7] when compared with distilling the required number of 2QKD key pairs.
Here we experimentally demonstrate the salient features of the N-BB84 protocol introduced in [8] with a state-of-the-art photonic platform. An untrusted quantum server prepares and distributes L rounds of the maximally entangled GHZ state, |GHZ ≡ (|0 ⊗N + |1 ⊗N )/ √ 2, to N participants in the network. In our work we implement a four-party protocol consisting of: Alice (A), Bob 1 (B 1 ), Bob 2 (B 2 ), and Bob 3 (B 3 ), see Fig. 1 (a). Each user performs quantum measurements on their respective photon in either the Zbasis {|0 , |1 } constituting type-1 rounds, or the X-basis
2} for type-2 rounds. Type-1 rounds are used to obtain the raw key as these measurements ensure all users in the protocol obtain the same bit value, in the absence of noise, owing to the structure of the GHZ state. Type-2 rounds are carried out randomly with probability p, for a total of m = L · p rounds, and are used to detect the presence of an eavesdropper. Users coordinate the measurement sequence using L · h (p) bits of a pre-shared key. In particular, one user generates the L-bit string indicating the measurement type of each round. The string can be classically compressed, shared, and decompressed by the other parties. Note that the values of p are typically on the order of 0.02, leading to a small value of h(p), i.e., the amount of information to be initially pre-shared is small.
Once the measurements are complete, users proceed to verify the security of their key by performing parameter estimation. All users announce their outcomes for a subset of the type-1 rounds, m in total and randomly chosen, and all m type-2 rounds to determine A quantum server distributes entangled GHZ states to Alice, who initiates the protocol, and Bobs 1, 2, and 3. They establish a common key from a pre-agreed sequence of Z measurements while checking the security by measuring X. (b) Experimental setup. A mode-locked picosecond laser (ti:sapph) multiplexed to 320 MHz repetition rate supplies two entangled photon sources which are based on parametric downconversion in periodically poled KTP crystals (PPKTP), pumped bidirectionally in a Sagnac loop for producing polarisation-entangled Bell pairs [19] . Down-converted photons are separated from the pump with dichroic mirrors (DM) and coupled into fibres (FC). One photon from each source non-classically interfere on a polarising beamsplitter (PBS) creating the four-photon GHZ state, see Methods for details. Each user receives their photon via single-mode fibres and performs projective measurements in the Z(X) basis by using a quarter-(QWP) and half-wave plate (HWP), and a polarising beamsplitter (PBS) before detection with superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPD). Detection events are time-tagged and counted in coincidence within a 1 ns time window.
x /2 respectively. We define the quantum bit error rate (QBER) as QBER m .
= max Q m ABi . All users retain n = L − 2m bits forming the raw conference key, subsequently corrected with an error correction scheme and shortened with privacy amplification to ensure security. Finally, all users remove L · h (p) bits from their secret conference key to encode the pre-shared keys for subsequent protocols. Hence, our protocol is a key-growing routine, as in any known QKD scheme.
In our experiment, see Fig. 1 (b), we employ two high-brightness, polarisation-entangled photon-pair sources [19] at telecommunication wavelength (1550 nm). We generate four-photon GHZ states by non-classically interfering one photon from each source on a PBS, which has success probability of 1/2 (see for example [20] or Methods for details). We use commercially available superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) with typical quantum efficiencies of > 80% at this wavelength.
We establish the upper bound on the performance of our protocol by assuming an infinite number of rounds can be performed, L → ∞. In this asymptotic regime nearly all rounds are used to extract the raw key, p → 0. We evaluate the asymptotic key rate (AKR) as the frac-tion of secret bits, , extracted from the total rounds [8] :
where h(x) = −x log 2 x−(1−x) log 2 (1−x) is the Shannon entropy. From Eq. 1 we note the AKR depends only on the noise parameters Q X and QBER. We estimate these parameters experimentally using a large sample size of type-1 and type-2 measurements to minimise uncertainties. The results are shown in Fig. 2 .
We denote the network topology as {d 1 , d 2 , d 3 }, where d i is the fibre length in kilometres between B i and the server. Alice remains fixed at 2 m from the server in all cases. We implement four scenarios: {0, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 20}, {0, 10, 20}, and {20, 10, 20}, corresponding to measured network losses (in dB) of 0, 4.84, 7.57, and 11.77. The observed four-photon generation rates g R for these scenarios are 40.89 Hz, 12.68 Hz, 6.31 Hz, and 2.03 Hz. In addition, for the finite-key analysis only, we consider a fifth asymmetric scenario {5, 10, 20}. The conference key rate is determined as a product of the fractional AKR and the recorded generation rates g R . In all cases we observe similar noise parameters, and thus AKR, indicating that the entanglement quality is not degraded significantly by the transmission fibres. The experimental AKR is mainly limited by multiple-pair generations at the sources and by spectral impurities of the photons, Asymptotic key rate results. (top) We determine the fractional asymptotic key rate (AKR) by measuring QX and QBER without performing the full protocol. We evaluate AKR for a range of loss conditions set by the placement of fibre links in the network. (bottom) The conference key rate is plotted as a function of the total fibre length in the network. We include results of the generation rates with measurementbasis switching using our implementation, see Methods for details.
see Supplementary Information (SI) for details. To the best of our knowledge, our work demonstrates for the first time the distribution of 1550 nm four-qubit entangled state in long telecom fibres, proving the viability of polarisation-encoded photons to remain highly entangled over long distances.
We also include the adjusted conference key rates when we perform the protocol with actively switched measurement bases. In our experiment, this is accomplished by rotating wave plates with motorised stages that are slow compared to the clock rate of our sources. As such, this leads to a reduced overall rate as shown in Fig. 2 
(see Methods for details).
Our N-BB84 implementation operates at low rates and a complete finite-key analysis, where a fractional secret key rate (SKR) is adjusted to take into account finite statistics from parameter estimation, is crucial. For our experiment, we determine the optimal fraction of type-2 measurements to be p = m/L = 0.012. With this value of p, the amount of information reserved for the pre-shared key is h(p) = 0.093, see Methods for more details. Moreover, we set a total security parameter i.e. the maximal probability that an eavesdropper gains nonzero information about the key to be 1.8 × 10 −8 , see SI for details. We implement the protocol in an asymmetric fibre network {5, 10, 20} with a measured loss of 9.53 dB
Number of rounds, L Secret key rate (bits/round)
Finite key results. We implement all steps in the N-BB84 protocol for a range of L rounds to retrieve the final key of length and evaluate the secret key rate, SKR = /L. In our experiment we employ LDPC codes with fixed code rates, r, using the estimated QBER in each run. We implement privacy amplification using Toeplitz matrices, then remove a portion of the final key for the pre-shared bits used to encode the measurement rounds. The upper bound given by Eq. 5 is shown compared with the experimental data. (b) Encryption. We generate an tot-secure conference key of 1.15 × 10 6 bits. Using 1.06 × 10 6 bits, Alice encrypts an image (8-bit RGB, 280 by 158 pixels) employing a one-time-padlike scheme. Alice sends the encrypted image over a public channel allowing only Bob 1, Bob 2, and Bob 3, who share the conference key, to decode the image. in total. We obtain over 4.09 × 10 6 type-1 rounds and 5.01 × 10 4 type-2 rounds during 177 hours of continuous measurement. Due to the long measurement time active polarisation feedback was implemented to minimise noise owing to thermal drifts in the laboratory (see Methods for details). Once the raw key is distilled by all users, we implement one-way error correction using low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes complying with the Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB-S2) standard [21] . The code was adapted to our multi-party scenario, simultaneously correcting Bob 1, Bob 2, and Bob 3 keys. This step ensures that all parties share a common key, however it remains partly secret owing to information leaked during error correction, and any potential eavesdropping during the distribution step. In order to reduce the information held by any potential eavesdropper, we implement one round of privacy amplification on the entire raw key, re-ducing its final length. We use Toeplitz matrices for this purpose, a class of universal-2 hash functions [22] that can be implemented efficiently for our given key size.
We estimate the theoretical performance of our postprocessing steps by evaluating the noise parameters Q X = 0.05 and QBER = 0.0159, which we use to calculate the upper bound set by Eq. 5 in the Methods section and plotted in Fig 3(a) (dashed line). When performing the protocol in earnest with a finite data set to estimate these parameters, we replace the Shannon limit for the error correction term h(QBER m + 2ξ z ) in Eq. 5 with the fraction of parity bits disclosed by Alice.
Finally, we use the secret conference key to encrypt an image of a Cheshire cat that is shared between the parties in a brief conference call (Fig. 3b ).
The security of our protocol is based on the proof in [8] and the assumptions therein. We note that Alice's measurement device is trusted whereas Bobs' measurement devices can be untrusted, as long as the detectors are memoryless. Adapting the quantum conferencekey agreement protocol for full (measurement-)deviceindependence is a work in progress, see for example [23, 24] .
Experimental 2QKD key rates are bounded by the the well-known repeaterless bound [25] established for pointto-point rates. We remark that this bound does not apply to our scenario, where four users are connected to a common server according to some network topology. New bounds were recently found if repeaters are introduced in a chain-like network [26] showing that higher key-rates can in principle be achieved. As our scenario omits repeaters these new bounds do not hold either, however we might expect similar improvements in the maximum key rates as opposed to standard end-to-end 2QKD protocols. An accurate model for fundamental bounds in a general network to apply to our scenario is still missing. We study this briefly in the SI, highlighting the non-trivial conference key rate dependence on asymmetric distribution of noise in the network.
Our post-processing, Fig. 3 , is currently based on oneway LDPC error correction. The well-known two-way CASCADE protocol [27] outperforms the optimal LDPC approach in two-party QKD for small QBER [28] , however, in the multi-user case this improvement will likely be offset by the additional iterations needed to correct uncorrelated errors in (N − 1) raw keys. In contrast, LDPC codes disclose a fixed amount of information that depends only on the largest QBER between Alice and any of the Bobs in the network. To the best of our knowledge, no proof exists for the optimal strategy to achieve the minimal bit disclosure rate when implementing error correction in the multi-user QKD scenario, and we leave this as an open question for future work.
Experimentally, future steps will be directed towards GHZ rate increases, the extension to more conference parties, and field tests in established fibre networks [29] .
For direct GHZ-state transmission as demonstrated here, quantum CKA scales unfavourably with the number of users due to the exponential reduction in multi-photon detection considering unavoidable transmission losses. However, loss will not be a problem in fully-featured quantum networks where CKA will retain its significant (N-1) rate advantage.
METHODS

Entangled photon source
We produce photon-pairs using Type-II collinear spontaneous parametric down conversion (SPDC) implemented in a 22 mm long periodically-poled KTP (PP-KTP) crystal. Both of our sources are optically pumped using a mode-locked laser operating with a nominal repetition rate of 80 MHz, 1.4 ps pulses and its central wavelength at 774.9 nm. A passive pulse interleaver is used to quadruple the 80 MHz pulse train to 320 MHz [30] . The PPKTP crystals are embedded within a polarisationbased Sagnac interferometer [19] and pumped bidirectionally, using a half-wave plate to set diagonallypolarised light, to create polarisation-entangled photons at 1549.8 nm in the approximate state:
which we can map to any Bell state via local operation on one of the two photons.
With loose bandpass filters of 3 nm bandwidth, we measure an average source brightness of ∼ 4100 pairs/mW/s, with a symmetric heralding efficiency of ∼ 60% [31] . The average heralding efficiency reduces by ∼ 12% with a commensurate decrease of 45% in source brightness at the point of detection of the four users at zero distance. We characterise each photon pair source by performing quantum state tomography, reconstructing density matrices using maximum-likelihood estimation and Monte-Carlo simulations based on Poissonian count statistics to determine errors. For each source we obtain a typical two-photon Bell-state fidelity F = 95.58 ± 0.15% and purity P = 92.07 ± 0.27%, while entanglement is measured by concurrence C = 92.38 ± 0.21%.
The four-photon GHZ state is created by interfering one photon from each source on a polarising beamsplitter (PBS), which transmits horizontally and reflects vertically polarised photons. Post-selecting on the case where one photon is emitted in each output, which occurs with a probability of 1/2, we obtain the state
where |h ≡ |0 and |v ≡ |1 represent horizontal and vertical polarisations respectively. We measure indepen-dent two-photon interference visibility of 92.96 ± 0.95% using 100 mW pump power, and four-qubit state tomography returns a purity and fidelity of P = 81.39 ± 0.83% and F = 87.58 ± 0.48% respectively.
Active switching
Most QKD protocols require random switching of the measurement basis, either passively or actively, with each clock cycle. The same holds for the N-BB84 protocol, where users switch between the Z/X measurement bases according to a pre-agreed random sequence. Since all users implement the same measurement sequence, passive switching is not an option.
As noted, p is typically small hence switching between bases occurs relatively infrequently. In addition the multi-photon detection rates in our experiment are low, hence the standard method of polarisation switching with electro-optic modulators would be excessive. We therefore implemented active switching using motorised rotation stages with switching speeds on the order of seconds-marginally slower than our average required switching periods, which reduces the maximum possible raw generation rate g R .
We evaluate the adjusted generation rate g R for the finite key scenario for the {5, 10, 20} topology, by performing 1000 rounds of the protocol with active basis switching. We set p = 0.02, thus 20 type-2 rounds are randomly allocated in the measurement sequence. We measured the reduced key generation rate and found g R /g R = 0.91.
This adjustment ratio is rate dependent. We find the lower bound on g R by assuming the type-2 rounds are never sequential hence each occurrence requires time to switch. This leads to the general expression,
where τ s is the switching speed. We use this equation to extrapolate the adjusted generation rates obtained in the asymptotic case as shown by orange dots in Fig. 2 .
Active polarisation control
The optical fibre links in our experiment are realised by spools of bare SMF28 fibre. Thermal drifts in the laboratory introduces unwanted rotations in polarisation which, if uncorrected, leads to added noise in the protocol. These effects are typically negligible for short fibre lengths, e.g., in our testing we found the 5 km spool added no observable noise greater than with a 2 m fibre link, while the 10 km and 20 km spools showed significant added noise in Q ABi measurements.
We implement active polarisation control to correct for these effects during key transmission to preserve lownoise operation throughout the protocol. The feedback control loop is implemented by performing single-qubit tomography in each fibre to characterise the unitary transformation on the polarisation qubits. We then use the polarisation optics in the measurement stages to undo the rotations on the qubits and perform measurements in the required basis. In our setup we carry out onequbit tomography of all four fibre links simultaneously, including post-processing, to obtain an estimate of the unitary operation and implement the corrective action on the motorised waveplates. This takes less than 30 seconds and is performed once every ∼ 20 minutes for an optimal tradeoff between maintaining a high duty-cycle while minimising bit error rates.
Error correction using LDPC codes
The use of LDPC codes allows one party to initialise the routine by encoding a block of k raw bits into a j-bit codeword using a H (j−k)×j parity check matrix, where the ratio r = k/j defines the code rate which in principle can be any number from 0 to 1. The DVB-S2 standard provides H matrices already computed for a set of different code rates specified for a codeword size of j = 64 800 bits. In our experiment, we set the code rate according to the estimated QBER using m samples with appropriate ξ Z correction. From the provided set of code rates we used 1/2, 1/3 and 1/4 for small, mid and large values of L as shown in Fig. 3(a) . Alice uses the parity matrix to calculate the parity check bits, then sends to all parties the parity check bits and the H matrix through an authenticated classical channel. Each Bob implements a decoding algorithm consisting of simple addition, comparison and table look-up operations. The codes used here have been modified from MatLAB communication packages based on the DVB-S2 standards [21] . The number of parity bits communicated during EC is discarded to ensure security of the final conference key.
Finite-key conference rate
When using a finite number of rounds, the estimated parameters Q m X and QBER from the m type-2 and type-1 rounds, are affected by statistical error which must be taken into account in the final key rate. The fractional key rate is given by,
where N is number of users in the protocol, (ξ X , ξ Z ) are finite-key correction terms and ( EC , P E , P A ) set the security parameters of our protocol, see SI for further details. The final term in Eq. 5 is the portion of the final key removed after PA, to account for the preshared key used in marking the type-2 rounds.
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION Experimental Noise
As outlined in the main text, for the state employed in the protocol as in Eq. (3), we expect Q X = 0 and QBER = 0. However, in the experimental implementation, the values observed are always non-zero. In our setup as in Fig. 1 , the dominant sources of noise come from high-order generations in the PDC process and imperfect mode-matching at the PBS. A comprehensive model to account the effects of the noise on the expected value of Q X and QBER, is non-trivial and goes beyond the scope of this work. However, we provide some qualitative remarks and suggestions for improvements.
Due to the probabilistic nature of the PDC process, there is always a non-zero probability that more than a single pair is generated within the crystal embedded in the Sagnac interferometer. This effect can be quantitatively accounted for by the so-called signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), defined as the ratio of single-pair events over the multiple-pair events. Note that increasing the pump power decreases the SNR. As shown in Fig. S1 , both Q X and QBER depend indeed from the pump power. The dependence is well fit by a linear trend, at least within the power range we considered. Note that for the data shown represents the setup initially, which was later optimised for our experiments hence the values shown here are slightly greater than those reported in the main text at 100 mW. Importantly, whereas the QBER tends to 0 in the limit of power → 0, the Q X does not. Qualitatively, this can be understood from the fact that the QBER only depends on the polarisation of the photons in the state in Eq. (3), and not on their coherence. On the other hand, the value of Q X is directly affected by the amount of coherence in the GHZ state considered for FIG. S1. QX and QBER as a function of power. Within the range of power considered, the trend is linear although the slope for the QBER is greater than the slope for QX . Moreover, QX is lower-bounded by the value of 0.05 at zeropower.
the protocol. In turn, the state's coherence is influenced by all the degrees of freedom, i.e.: polarisation, photonnumber, time and spectrum. Decreasing the powertherefore increasing the SNR-only affects the purity in the photon-number degree of freedom but cannot affect the other degrees of freedom. In particular, although our photons are spectrally filtered at the source, they retain some spectral mixture intrinsic to the PDC process. This leads to non-ideal interference at the PBS, and therefore to a non-zero lower bound for the measurable Q X . Such lower bound can be linked to the experimentally measured visibility as following. Assuming that the photons at the PBS successfully interfere with some probability t, we can write the state ρ o after the interference as:
Where ρ s is the density matrix of the state in case of success, given by ρ s = |GHZ GHZ|, and ρ f is the density matrix in case of failure given by (|hhhh hhhh| + |vvvv vvvv|)/2. The expected Q X for this state is
Note that for t = 1, Q X = 0, and for t = 0, Q X = 1/2. Similarly, given the experimentally measured visibility V exp we expect Q X = 0 and Q X = 1/2 for V exp = 1 and V exp = 0 respectively. We can thus, at least for these two extreme cases, interpret t as V exp . Assuming that t ≈ V exp in general, we have that for V exp = 0.9, Q X = 0.05 in accordance with our results (see main text). It should be noted however, that the interference at the PBS is a coherent process, which might not be fully characterised by the simple model just presented. Hence, in general, we can conclude that Q X (1 − V exp )/2.
Security parameters in NBB84
As stated in the main text, Eq. (5) represents the achievable secret key rate of the NBB84 protocol when the parties perform a finite number of rounds L. In other words, Alice needs to set the length of the PA output to Eq. (5) in order to ensure that the established key is secure with security parameter tot . The security parameter tot represents the maximal probability that a potential eavesdropper gains at least some information about the established key. It is related to the failure probabilities of the different stages of the protocol as follows: tot = EC + P A + 2 P E , where EC is the maximal failure probability of the EC procedure and P A represents the same in the case of PA, while the last term is related to the failure probability of the PE step. In particular, the observed values Q m ABi and Q m X in the 2m rounds devoted to PE might differ from the correspondent values Q n ABi and Q n X characterizing the remaining n = L − 2m rounds which are used to extract the secret key. The deviation of Q n ABi and Q n X is quantified by the theory of random sampling without replacement [32] and must be accounted for in the secret key rate Eq. (5), by taking the worst-case in order to preserve security. As shown in Ref. [8] , the distance |Q n ABi − Q m ABi | (|Q n X − Q m X |) between the pairwise bit discordance (the parameter Q n X ) and its observed value is not larger than 2ξ Z (2ξ X ) with probability at least 1 − Z (1 − X ), where:
By combining the above statements one can deduce that:
where we defined the total PE failure probability 2 PE as follows:
Note that the probabilities Z and X , and hence 2 P E , can be chosen freely as to maximize the resulting secret key rate, with the only constraint that: P E ≤ tot . Indeed, in our experiment we maximize the key rate in Eq. (5) over the failure probabilities Z , X , EC and P A and over the fraction of type-2 rounds p, having fixed the security parameter to tot = 1.8 × 10 −8 and using preliminary estimations for QBER and Q X . We obtain optimal values: p = 0.012, EC ∼ 10 −13 and P A ∼ 10 −10 . The optimal value for p is then used to establish the fraction of type-2 measurements that need to be performed during data collection. We remark that since EC and P A possess an operational meaning as described above, one needs to verify that the actual procedures implemented for EC and PA fail at most with probabilities 10 −13 and 10 −10 , respectively. Due to the lack of a quantitative estimation of the failure probability characterizing the procedures adopted for EC and PA in our experiment, we could not verify that they are below the stated values. Nevertheless, we confirm that both procedures never failed in all the instances where they were used.
For further details, we refer the reader to Ref. [8] .
Topology dependence in a conference key scenario
Conversely from the standard Alice-Bob scenario, conference key protocols are performed over a network where different users are connected according to some topology, and each link might be some noisy quantum channel. Therefore, in general, the conference key rates might depend on the noise distribution in the network opening a new problem absent in 2QKD.
FIG. S2. Plot of QX as a function of the noise parameters pB1 and pB2 characterising the depolarising channels (Eq. S7) of Bob 1 and Bob 2, respectively. The noise parameter of Bob 3 is fixed to: pB3 = 1.5 − pB1 − pB2. We also insert the vector field of the gradient of QX with respect to pB1 and pB2.
Here, we study the 4-party network considered in the main text i.e. four users connected to one common server, with the noise affecting each link modeled as a depolarising channel
Therefore, in general we can assume the channels of Alice, Bob 1, Bob 2 and Bob 3 to have noise parameters p A , p B1 , p B2 , and p B3 , respectively. For simplicity, we consider the case where Alice's channel is noiseless p A = 0 as the results are qualitatively the same. In this case, the expressions of Q X and Q ABi , for a depolarised 4-qubit GHZ state with noise parameters p B1 , p B2 and p B3 , are Q X (p B1 , p B2 , p B3 ) = [(p B1 − 1) (p B2 − 1) (p B3 − 1) + 1] 2 Q ABi (p Bi ) = p Bi 2 (S7) Q X depends on the noise parameters of all the channels, whereas Q ABi only depends locally on the noise parameter affecting the link connecting Alice and B i . Of course, both functions have a global minimum in (p B1 , p B2 , p B3 ) = (0, 0, 0), that is when all the channels are noiseless.
What is interesting to study is whether both the functions have a minimum with the constraint p B1 + p B2 + p B3 = c where c is a constant in the interval c ∈ [0, 3]. In practice, this corresponds to fix some total amount of noise strength c on the network and finding which solution gives the highest key rate i.e. the lowest Q X and Q ABi . It is straightforward to see that the minimum of max i Q ABi is given by p B1 = p B2 = p B3 = c/3. To find the minimum of Q X , we compute the gradient of f (p B1 , p B2 ) = Q X (p B1 , p B2 , c − p B1 − p B2 )
The plot in Fig. S2 shows the function f (p B1 , p B2 ) for c = 1.5 with at the bottom the vector field of the gradient as given by ∇f . One can verify that the minimum of the function is in p B1 = p B2 = p B3 = c/3, therefore we conclude that the maximum conference key rate is achievable when the noise is symmetrically spread over the network. This result intuitively reflects the symmetry of the GHZ state, however in practice we can never assume the same amount of noise in all the channels. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the function is quite flat around the minimum. It follows that for small deviations from the symmetric configuration the effect on the key rate could be neglected. We leave open for investigation similar studies that account for different noise models.
